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Abstract
We employ stochastic dynamic microsimulations to analyse and fore-
cast the pension cost dependency ratio for England and Wales from 1991
to 2061, evaluating the impact of the ongoing state pension reforms and
changes in international migration patterns under different Brexit scenar-
ios. To fully account for the recently observed volatility in life expectan-
cies, we propose mortality rate model based on deep learning techniques,
which discovers complex patterns in data and extrapolated trends. Our
results show that the recent reforms can effectively stave off the “pension
crisis” and bring back the system on a sounder fiscal footing. At the same
time, increasingly more workers can expect to spend greater share of their
lifespan in retirement, despite the eligibility age rises. The population
ageing due to the observed postponement of death until senectitude often
occurs with the compression of morbidity, and thus will not, perforce, in-
trinsically strain healthcare costs. To a lesser degree, the future pension
cost dependency ratio will depend on the post-Brexit relations between
the UK and the EU, with “soft” alignment on the free movement lowering
the relative cost of the pension system compared to the “hard” one. In
the long term, however, the ratio has a rising tendency.
1 Introduction
The social and economic implications of a rapidly ageing population, a con-
sequence of low fertility rates and rising longevity, are becoming increasingly
apparent in the UK and other developed countries. A shrinking share of work-
ers has to fill the labour void left by the retiring ones and concurrently provide
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for their support, as reflected in the growing old-age dependency ratio [1]. To
reduce the strain the new demographic situation places on public services, in
particular the state pensions, benefits, and health care, the UK introduced a
broad reform of the state pension system, raising the retirement age for all born
after 1950. The former pension ages of 65 for men and 60 for women introduced
in 1948 are due to be equalised by 2018, and subsequently increase for everybody
to 68 by 2046. The economic and demographic effects of approaching Brexit
will add to the magnitude of population changes against which the affordability
of the pension system will be tested in the following decades.
This work evaluates the impact of the state pension reforms on the pension
cost dependency ratio (namely, the number of people at or above the retirement
age to people between ages 15 and that retirement age) under different post-
Brexit scenarios. To this end, we perform stochastic dynamic microsimulations
of the England and Wales (E&W) population based on available historical data,
as described in Ref. [1], from 1991 (and forecasting beyond 2014) to 2061. The
simulated future scenarios focus on changing migration patterns between the
UK and the EU after the Brexit. In each scenario, we compare the depen-
dency ratios assuming the state pension age with and without the past reforms.
To fully account for the increasing trends in life expectancies, we have imple-
mented a custom extrapolation model for mortality rates, based on deep learning
techniques. The historical overview of state pension reforms and demographic
changes in the UK in Sec. 2 provides insight in the presented analysis and re-
sults. Section 3 describes the modelling framework for neural networks and the
obtained mortality rate forecasts. The microsimulation results for the pension
cost dependency ratio are presented in Sec. 4 followed by the summary.
2 Historical background and future scenarios
The foundations of the British social security system have been laid at the early
stages of the state formation. A host of demographic, economic, political, and
religious changes in the medieval England impelled the so-called Poor Law [2].
For several centuries, it formed the basis of the government provision of relief
for the “impotent poor” while forcing able-bodied “vagrants” into the infamous
workhouses. Yet the idea of retirement and state pensions dawned with the 18th
century industrial revolution [3]. At its early labour-intensive stage, millions of
workers migrated to cities, to be eventually forced out from their factory jobs by
rapid technological developments and the inflow of younger competition from
the declining agriculture. Simultaneously, demographic trends characteristic of
a maturing economy conduced to the growing share of “dependants” at the top
of the population pyramid, boosting the case for the old age pension. Last but
not least, industrialisation created a wealth to fund it.
The campaign for social welfare reform culminated in the Old-Age Pensions
Act 1908 which established a gender-blind, non-contributory means-tested state
pension for persons over the age of 70. From the start, the policy has been
shaped by a multitude of conflicting agendas, from the conservative desire to
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limit income redistribution, through the Treasury policy of reducing government
spending, to socialist demands of a tax-funded and universal subsistence scheme.
Less visible (at least until the post-WW1 period) but as important as the class
conflict was the gender division: although women constituted the majority of
the aged poor [4], the debate over pensions focused on the plight of “worn-out”
male worker. As a result, women’s pension rights were eroded in post-1908
reforms.
Meeting the demands of emerging interest groups for increasing the level
and scope of the pensions was considered “fiscally unsound” in the atmosphere
of austerity prevalent in the 1920s [5]. Thus, the Conservative Party and civil
service mandarins pushed for the switch to a contributory system (funded by
worker’s contributions paid during lifetime and available only to those with a
minimum employment record). Such a system was expected to be more resistant
to demands for increasing the pension amount and to require much less redistri-
bution of income between the wealthy and the lower classes. This reactionary
policy met with weak opposition from the Labour parliamentary leadership and
culminated in the Widows, Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act
1925. As well as introducing a non-means tested, contributory pension system,
the policy lowered the pension age from 70 to 65 for both men and women in
hope to alleviate the unemployment of younger workers. Since many women
did not have paid employment, they gained the right to a full pension based
on their husband’s contributions, which tied them financially to marriage and
created a special group of interest, National Spinsters’ Association. In 1940, fe-
male pension age was reduced to 60 and supplementary means-tested pensions
introduced to address the problem of poverty among older unmarried women [6].
In 1941, UK government asked Sir William Beveridge to produce a compre-
hensive report, proposing a new “from the cradle to the grave” social welfare
system for post-war Britain. Resulting from his work, the National Insurance
Act 1946 introduced a universal flat-rate contributory pension higher than the
pre-war amount: £1 6s for a single person and £2 2s for a married couple, funded
from workers’ National Insurance contributions and payable from the age of 65
for men and 60 for women. National Insurance contributions were mandatory
for everyone except married women, and no benefits were provided for divorced
women. Thus, the new system reinforced the dependency of women on their
husbands’ pensions, a problem which became increasingly apparent with the
post-WW2 changes in lifestyle (higher prevalence of single parenthood and di-
vorce). Another important feature of the National Insurance was the retirement
condition for the payment of pension (the aim of which was to prevent pension-
ers from undercutting younger workers in the labour market). However, because
of post-war labour shortage, old men were encouraged to remain working past
the pension eligibility age and two-thirds of them chose to do so [7].
To satisfy the needs of higher-earning workers, the National Insurance Act
1959 (implemented in 1961) introduced an additional earnings-based top-up
pension, replaced in 1978 by the State Earnings-related State Pension Scheme.
Workers who decided to provision privately for an additional pension could
choose to opt out of SERPS and pay lower NI contributions. SERPS was re-
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placed in 2002 by the State Second Pension Scheme, with the aim to skew the
benefits of additional pensions in favour of low and moderate earners at the ex-
pense of the wealthier workers, and improve the situation of carers and disabled
persons. The optional additional pensions have been abolished in 2016, when
they have been all replaced by a single flat-rate state pension, bringing the UK
pension system back to its Beveridgean roots and ending its post-war foray into
the Bismarckian regime.1
One key element of the 1948 pension system—the different pension age for
men and women—has been left unchanged until the last decade of the 20th
century. Following the European Court rulings, the UK had to equalise male
and female pension age, and in order to defuse the “demographic bomb”, decided
to gradually increase women’s pension age to 65. Its subsequent increase to 68
for everyone in Pensions Act 2007 was motivated by rising life expectancies.
The financial crisis spurred the Conservative-Liberal coalition government to
accelerate this increase twice, in Pensions Acts 2011 and 2014.2
As the mortality rates at all ages continue to fall thanks to improving stan-
dards of living and advances in medicine, senior citizens are the fastest growing
segment of the UK population. In 1948, when the National Insurance Act was
implemented, retiring men and women were expected to live additional 11.6 and
18.7 years, respectively. According to the latest Office for National Statistics
projections, those numbers rose to 21.4 and 28.4 [9]. At the same time, fertility
rates—after experiencing a series of demographic upheavals (collapsing during
Spanish flu pandemic and World Wars, and rebounding in the 1920 birth-rate
spike and during post-WW2 and the 1960s “baby booms”, the latter reaching
2.93 children per woman at its peak in 1964)—fell and stabilised around the cur-
rent average of 1.81 children per woman [10]. The longevity together with high
immigration (mainly from the EU after the 2004 enlargement [11]) contribute
to the growth of population size, despite the low birth rates [1].
The above factors shape the population age structure, and thus are impor-
tant considerations for the provision of state pensions. Additionally, economic
and demographic effects of Brexit (especially the free movement arrangements)
will potentially have a significant impact on the affordability of the pension
system [12].
1European state pension systems range from a Bismarckian design with no redistribu-
tion and pensions that are earnings-related, to a Beveridgean one with flat pensions. The
latter comprises the main part of the UK system of public support for pensioners, next to
earnings-related benefits, flat-rate non-contributory benefits and means-tested benefits. It is
worth noting that although its design translates into replacement rates that fall as the income
increases, high earners benefit from tax allowances on private savings.
2In July 2017, the government decided to accelerate the state pension age rise to 68 again,
following the recommendations of the Cridland report. It will now be phased in between 2037
and 2039, rather than from 2044 as was previously proposed.[8]
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3 Mortality rates forecast using neural networks
Future mortality rates for all age and sex groups are required as inputs for our
microsimulation. Rates of survival were consistently improving throughout the
UK population for more than 100 years, owing to medical progress and bettering
standards of living. A reasonable projection should continue this trend. How
much further improvement in the lifespans of future generations can be expected
is, however, far from certain, with some forecasts predicting over 30% chance
for a person born today of reaching the ranks of centenarians [13]. Inevitably,
the further away in the future we project mortality rates, the higher is their
uncertainty. Simple analytic models [14, 15] provide more stability, but may
not be flexible enough to reflect all trends in the data.
We propose a robust forecasting model based on the deep learning ap-
proach [16]. It uses a recurrent neural network, which is dedicated to the analy-
sis of dynamic temporal behaviours, to exploit the information about mortality
trends available from historical data [17]. Given the last N = 40 mortality rates
for a fixed age group, our model uses a recurrent neural network to predict the
(N + 1)-th one and then feed it back as part of the input used to predict the
(N +2)-th rate, etc. Differently than in [18], we use a neural network to predict
the mortality rates directly, without additional assumptions about the random
walk model used to evolve latent parameters in time. The complete mathemat-
ical description of our model and the procedure of optimising N is provided in
the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Mortality rate forecasts (beyond 2016) obtained from the neural net-
work model (solid lines) for men and women by age with 95% bootstrap confi-
dence intervals. Dashed lines represent projections from the ONS model [19].
The obtained mortality rate forecasts are shown in Fig. 1 for selected age
groups of men and women. The model training and extrapolation procedure has
been repeated 100 times in order to remove the noise arising from the random
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Figure 2: Survival curves for men and women in left and right panels, respec-
tively. Rectangularisation can be observed for successive birth cohorts, partic-
ularly stronger for women.
initialisation of neural network parameters (see the Appendix). The mortality
rates are calculated as medians of values from individual runs, while the 95%
confidence intervals are their 2.5% (lower bound) and 97.5% (upper bound)
percentiles. The results indicate a progressing decline of mortality for men and
women at all age. The men’s mortality rates fall faster than women’s. This
trend is particularly strong for male teenagers, young adults, as well as ages 65–
85, where it significantly diverges from the ONS results. Conversely, mortality
rates for centenarians and senior women (above 85) do not fall as dramatically
and remain at substantially higher levels than the ONS projections.
The postponement of death to senectitude due to population ageing occurs
with the rectangularisation of survival curves presented in Fig. 2. Furthermore,
the age distribution in deaths is more compressed for women than men, giv-
ing the latter a noticeably higher chance of becoming centenarians, but also a
higher risk of dying younger. An akin effect of men outliving women has been
already observed in the British population. Men have been catching women up
in average lifespan over the last decades, the first benefiting from the industry
move from physical labour to services and adapting healthier lifestyle, while the
second often taking the toll of combining full-time jobs with housework [20]. At
the same time, the positive correlation between life expectancy and socioeco-
nomic status [21] combined with gender imbalance in the latter [22] may cause
an uplift in the men’s age of death and the observed widening of its distribution.
Detailed historical and forecast patterns of relative mortality rates of men
to women of the same age are shown in Fig. 3 (in logarithmic scale). The bright
regions indicate higher rates for women, while the dark ones higher rates for
men. According to historical data, regions 1 and 2 are associated with four
times higher prevalence of deaths from suicides, transport accidents and misuse
of alcohol and drugs in young men, and twice higher prevalence of cardiovascu-
lar diseases in older men, as compared to their female peers, respectively [23].
Region 3 corresponds to an increased number of women’s deaths at old age,
mainly due to the Alzheimer disease and dementia. The forecast reveals mortal-
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Figure 3: The ratio of contemporaneous mortality rates for men and women
of the same age. Light regions (1, 2 and 5) indicate higher mortality rates for
women than men, and dark ones (3, 4 and 6) otherwise.
ity trends transforming those patterns. In region 4, women in their thirties have
higher mortality rates than men (although very low for both sexes), possibly
due to the commonly reported problem of young women adapting unhealthy be-
haviours (smoking and drinking). The weaker compression of mortality in men
than women accounts for regions 5 and 6, which represent the lower and upper
tails of men’s distribution of age in deaths observed in the survival curves.
Since fairness between generations requires that everybody spends a simi-
lar proportion of adult life contributing to and receiving a state pension, it is
interesting to compare the residual lifespan for people retiring under different
legislations. Table 1 displays life expectancies for cohorts who withdraw from
employment in different years and at different ages: at the age of 60 for women
and 65 for men, at the equal age of 65 and next 68. The life expectancies forecast
by our model grow faster than the state pension age rises. In particular, women
retiring in 2018 can expect to live 23 more years, which is almost 5 years longer
than women retiring in 1948, despite their state pension age rising from 60 to
65. The difference is particularly striking for men (as it is not attenuated by
the state pension age change), whose expected lifespan in retirement doubles.
The following state pension age rise to 68 does not reduce the residual lifespan
of those retiring in 2048, when it comes into effect (men gain another 1.5 year
of life). While under the old legislation women and men could expect to spend
24% and 15% of their lives in retirement, respectively, the subsequent reforms
guarantee a generous and fair approx. 26% to next generations. Furthermore,
they can expect to enjoy more years in good health [24], as the general health
improvements that lead to increasing life expectancy can also delay the on-
set and progress of diseases, perhaps replacing them with natural death upon
reaching a hypothesised biological limit of human lifespan [25]. This compres-
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sion of morbidity scenario forms a more optimistic projection of the impact of
population ageing on healthcare costs.
60 for women / 65 for men Equal age (65) Current reform (68)
1948 18.7 / 11.6 14.5 / 11.6 12.3 / 9.8
2018 28.5 / 22.2 23.4 / 22.2 20.7 / 19.3
2048 31.8 / 27.9 26.8 / 27.9 23.8 / 24.8
Table 1: Life expectancy in retirement for cohorts of women and men retiring in
different years and at ages indicated by different state pension systems reforms.
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Figure 4: Examples of sensitivities of the forecast mortality rates to historical
data for two population groups.
Figure 4 shows typical examples (for 30-year-old women and 85-year-old
men) of sensitivities of forecast mortality rates to historical ones, which are
calculated as ∂qt,i/∂qt′,i. The diagonal bands indicate a temporal autocorre-
lation in their trends with a length corresponding to the optimised input size
N = 40 (see Sec. A.5). It fades for longer time intervals, as expected from a
recursively applied one-step extrapolation model with a fixed memory length.
The obtained sensitivities are predominantly positive for young women, which
is a hallmark of the general longevity growth in the population.
The results for old men reveal a more complex pattern, namely, the extrap-
olated mortality rate has first a broadly negative sensitivity to the preceding
approximately 16 historical rates, and then a broadly positive sensitivity to the
previous 16 historical rates. A simple mathematical reasoning3 indicates that
3The Taylor series expansion of qt,i as a function of the preceding N rates qt′,i around a
value qi representative of the group i yields qt,i ≈
∑t−1
t′=t−N
∂qt,i/∂qt′,i
∣
∣
ξi
(qt′,i − qi) + ci,
where ξi := [qi, . . . , qi] and ci := exp f(ξi). The diagonal stripes in Fig. 4 indicate that the
sensitivities are translationally invariant in time, i.e. ∂qt,i/∂qt′,i ≈ st−t′,i. Hence, qt,i ≈∑t−1
t′=t−N
st−t′,iqt′,i + c
′
i, where all terms independent of t have been incorporated into c
′
i.
Since st−t′ is negative for t − t
′ ≤ 16, positive for 16 < t − t′ ≤ 32 and approaches zero
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the long term trend of mortality rate in this group has a tendency to “revert to
the mean” (cf. the mortality rate in Japan, which reverted in 1980s and grows
consistently). As the life expectancy projections for Britain has been reported
to flatline and slowly fall over the last years [26], our result suggests that the
falling trend may continue for a longer period of time owing to the long-term
rise of mortality rate in older population predicted by our model.
In the next section we use the obtained mortality rates as an input to the
microsimulation of the E&W population.
4 Pension cost dependency ratio estimation us-
ing microsimulation
Apart from the mortality rates forecasts obtained in the previous section, the
microsimulation model employed in this work uses the same methods and data
(updated with latest releases) as described in detail in Ref. [1]. It serves us
to evaluate the impact of state pension reforms and Brexit by calculating the
pension cost dependency ratio under two combined sets of scenarios.
The pension system scenarios assume different state pension age (SPA) with
and without changes introduced by the past reforms as follows (Fig. 5 displays
their timeline):
- Pre-reform: SPA equal to 65 for men and 60 for women (as introduced by
the National Insurance Act in 1948 and ignoring the subsequent reforms) over
the whole simulation period.
- Equal SPA: SPA for women starts to increase in April 2010 under the Pen-
sions Act 1995 by one month every month (by date of birth) to reach equal SPA
of 65 for man and women in March 2020. The transition is accelerated in April
2016 by the Pensions Act 2011 to complete in November 2018. SPA equals 65
for everyone over the remaining simulation time.
- SPA 68: SPA for men and women will equalise in 2020 following the (overrid-
den) Pensions Act 1995 and next rise to 66 between 2024 and 2026 (one month
every month), to 67 between 2034 and 2036 and to 68 between 2044 and 2046
(Pensions Act 2007).
- Accelerated SPA 68: (current) Following the current legislation, SPAs for
men and women equalise faster, i.e. in November 2018. Next, they rise to 66
between March 2019 and September 2020 (three months in the first month
followed by one month every one of next nine months), to 67 between 2026 and
2028 and to 68 between 2044 and 2046 (Pensions Acts 2007, 2011 and 2014).
The post-Brexit scenarios focus on migration patterns between the UK and
the EU after March 2019, namely:
- Status quo extrapolates current migration trends.
for t − t′ > 32, by further approximation we obtain qt,i − c
′
i ∼
∑
32
j=17 qt−j,i −
∑
16
j=1 qt−j,i.
Therefore, an increasing long-term trend of qt′,i tends to push qt,i down, while a decreasing
one tends to push it up, a phenomenon often called reversion to the mean.
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Figure 5: Timeline of changes to the state pension eligibility age by man or
woman’s birth date starting from 1921. State pension age established by con-
secutive reforms: National Insurance Act 1946 (implemented in 1948), European
Court ruling 1995 equalising pension age to 65 and Pensions Act 2007 increasing
it to 68, amended by Pensions Acts 2011 and 2014 accelerating the increase [27].
- Soft Brexit assumes amicable parting between the UK and the EU, followed
by only small changes in migration flows of the UK and EU citizens. Just
10% of the EU immigrants living in the UK will return to their country of
origin (those who will have arrived closer to the Brexit date will leave first).
This “exodus” will last 2 years and not involve the immigrants arriving after
Brexit. Simultaneously, a wave of returns of British emigrants living in other EU
countries will take place. We assume the repatriation of 10% of their population.
The level of regular migration flows of EU citizens to and from the UK will fall
to the average of 2000 and 2011 figures, whereas the outflow of British citizens
to the EU will be reduced by 80%.
- Hard Brexit drastically limits the migration between the UK and the EU as
many migrants lose the right of residence or decide to return to their country of
origin. We assume the “exodus” of 70% EU immigrants currently living in the
UK and the repatriation of 80% of the British living in the EU. The migration
of EU citizens to the UK will return to much lower levels from before the 2004
EU enlargement, while the outflow of Britons to the EU will decrease by 30%.
Figure 6 shows the trends of pension cost dependency ratio under the above
scenarios. The historical values of the ratio maintained a sustainable level until
2007. Beyond that period it began to rise owing to the population ageing.
The unprecedented rate of this process was propelled by post-war and 1960s
baby boomers entering the state pension age. In addition, their retirement
considerably reduces the workforce, whose large part consists of cohorts born in
the period of declining fertility rates, from the mid 1960s to 1970s. The trend
is somewhat softened by the influx of EU workers, especially the post-2004
enlargement wave.
The rise of state pension age for women starting in 2010 reverses the trend
sharply, creating a substantial gap between the old and the new pension scheme
scenarios. In particular, the reform reduces the pension cost dependency ratio
to the level from 2007. Afterwards, the ratio picks up its previous upward
10
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Figure 6: Pension cost dependency ratio under different state pension reforms
and different post-Brexit demographic scenarios (as described in Sec. 4).
trend fuelled by the advancing population ageing, with temporary reversions
due to consecutive rises of retirement age. The rapid growth from 2027 to
2038 is caused by retiring 1960s “baby boomers”. The growth subsides as the
forecast life expectancies stop to grow, and takes off again around 2049, when
the children of large 1960s cohorts enter their retirement age.
The magnitude and trend of pension cost dependency ratio strongly depend
on the considered state pension reforms and are moderately affected by the
varying migration patterns in different EU membership scenarios. In particular,
the currently introduced state pension age reforms will lead to a considerable
and permanent reduction of the ratio, almost reverting it back to the levels
from before 2007. However, in the long term—in particular after the large
1960s cohorts achieve the retirement age—the ratio will grow again under all
considered scenarios owing to the population ageing.
5 Summary
We have used our stochastic dynamic microsimulation model [1] to calculate
detailed forecasts of the pension cost dependency ratio for England and Wales
until 2061, with and without taking into account the series of retirement age rises
under the state pension system reforms initiated by the Labour and continued
by the Conservative governments as well as considering changes in international
migration patterns under different Brexit scenarios. To fully account for the
changing trends in life expectancies, we have implemented a custom extrap-
olation model for mortality rates, based on deep learning techniques. It has
discovered complex patterns in historical and forecast mortality statistics: the
survival curve rectangularisation with a stronger compression of the age of death
distribution for women, an arising trend of men outliving women and a possible
sustained reversion of mortality rate trend from decrease to growth. Our results
show that the recent reforms, although politically controversial, can be expected
to stave off the “pension crisis” and bring back the system on a sounder fiscal
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footing in the following decade. At the same time, more workers can expect to
spend longer share of their lifespan in retirement, despite the state pension age
rises. If the same factors promoting longevity also delay the disease processes in
the lifespan, they can expect to live more years in good health, without putting
an additional strain on the healthcare system. To a lesser degree, the future
pension cost dependency ratio will depend also on the post-Brexit relations be-
tween the UK and the EU, with “softer” alignment lowering the relative cost
of the pension system (due to the expected continued influx of young workers
from the EU) and “harder” one raising it. In the long term, however, a fur-
ther increase of the state pension age may be required if the current population
trends persist.
A Mortality rate extrapolation model
A.1 Data
The qx mortality rate qt,i is the probability that a person of age i (measured
in years) alive at time t will die within the next year. The vector of historical
mortality rates for all ages i = 0, . . . ,M is denoted by ~qt, where t = Ti, . . . , Tf
is time in years. In our case M = 100, Ti = 1951 and Tf = 2016. We analyse
data on the E&W population by age and sex (men or women).
A.2 Extrapolation model
It can be noted that for many age groups i the logarithm of the mortality rate qt,i
is approximately linear in t (see Fig. 1). Accordingly, we apply the extrapolation
model to log-rates xt,i := ln qt,i. It has the additional benefit of imposing the
constraint qt,i = e
xt,i ≥ 0.
We propose a recurrent neural network [16] extrapolation model which, given
a vector ~ξt−1,i := [xt−N,i, . . . , xt−1,i] of N consecutive log-rates, outputs the
value of xt,i = f(~ξt−1,i). To extrapolate beyond time Tf , the model is applied
recursively to ~ξTf ,i for each i. We denote the result of applying f recursively
k times by f (k), with f (1) ≡ f . Thus, the extrapolated log-rate xTf+k,i :=
f (k)(~ξTf ,i). For example,
xTf+2,i = f
(2)(~ξTf ,i) = f([xTf−N+2,i, . . . , xTf ,i, f
(1)(~ξTf ,i)]) . (1)
The function f : RN → R is calculated by the cell of the network: a composition
of linear and non-linear mappings between the input ~ξt−1,i and output xt,i.
The cell used by our model is a fully-connected neural network consisting of
K neuron layers ~zk ∈ R
Dk , k = 0, . . . ,K − 1. The input layer ~z0 is equal to the
argument of function f , RN ∋ ~z0 = ~ξt−1,i and D0 = N . Every subsequent layer
is a function of the previous one, of the following form ~zk = hk(Wk ·~zk−1+ bk),
where hk : R → R is the k-th activation function, Wk ∈ R
Dk×Dk−1 is the k-th
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weight matrix and ~bk ∈ R
Dk is the k-th bias vector. For k < K − 1, hk is the
so-called ReLU (rectified linear unit) function, while hK−1 is the identity:
hk(z) =
{
max(0, z) k < K − 1
z k = K − 1
.
The intermediate layers 0 < k < K − 1 are called hidden layers and have
dimension H . The last, output layer is the extrapolated value, R1 ∋ ~zK−1 =
[xt+1,i], with DK−1 = 1.
A.3 Model initialisation and training
Before training, bias vectors and weight matrices need to be assigned initial val-
ues. In our model, all bias vector elements are initialised to constant value binit >
0 and all weight matrix elements are drawn independently from N(0, σinit) dis-
tribution truncated at two standard deviations (larger values were discarded and
re-drawn). Such initialisation helps to avoid saturating the nonlinear activation
function and breaks the symmetry between different units [16].
Training the network consists in minimising the training loss c[f ], namely,
the average ℓ2 error between training targets ~yt,i := [xt,i, . . . , xt+Ntrain−1,i] and
training outputs ~ˆyt,i := [f(~ξt−1,i), f
(2)(~ξt−1,i), . . . , f
(Ntrain)(~ξt−1,i)] (see Eq. 1):
c[f ] :=
∑M
i=0
∑Tf−Ntrain−1
t=Ti+N
‖~yt,i − ~ˆyt,i‖
2
2
(M + 1)(Tf − Ti + 1−N −Ntrain + 1)
.
The loss c[f ] is minimised over the neural network weights and biases using the
RMSProp [28] variant of the Stochastic Gradient Descent method [16]. A crucial
aspect of this method is that c[f ] is not calculated over all pairs of ~yt,i and ~ˆyt,i,
as in the formula above, but over a randomly sampled mini-batch [16, 28] of size
B. The training is run for Ltrain steps of the RMSProp optimiser. The learning
rate of the optimiser is set to initial value α0 and then multiplied by a factor
0 < κ < 1 every ∆L steps if the average training loss over the last ∆L steps did
not decrease compared to the average over previous ∆L steps.
A.4 Model configuration
The model parameters are set as follows: input size N = 40, number of layers
K = 6 and number of hidden neurons per layer H = 64. The three parameters
and the number of training steps Ltrain = 270 000 were tuned using a valida-
tion set, as described in the next section. The remaining training parameters,
i.e. training sequence length Ntrain = 10 (relatively small in order to generate
more training sequences), mini-batch size B = 16, learning rate adjustment in-
terval ∆L = 10 000, initial learning rate α0 = 10
−4 and learning rate adjustment
factor κ = 0.9, as well as initialisation parameters, i.e. initial bias binit = 0.1 and
truncated standard deviation of initial weights σinit = 0.1, were set to reasonable
values.
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A.5 Implementation, parameter tuning and testing
The numerical code [29] has been implemented in Python and TensorFlow [30].
To determine the optimal values of model parameters and the number of
training steps, we split the historical data (for each sex separately) into three
sets: validation set (containing age groups 1, 6, 11, . . . , 91 and 96), test set
(containing age groups 2, 7, 12, . . . , 92 and 97) and training set (containing
all remaining age groups). We then train the model on the training set for
300 000 steps, testing several combinations of different values of N (15, 25 and
40), K (3–7) and H (32, 64, 128, 256 and 512). Each configuration is tested
for data for men and women separately. Every ∆L = 10 000 steps we calculate
the average loss on the validation set and record the lowest achieved validation
loss during the entire training period, as well as the validation loss after the
maximum 300 000 training steps (the procedure is guided by the observation
that, during training, the validation set loss at first decreases along with the
training set loss, but after some time it starts to increase, indicating the onset
of overfitting). The final and minimum validation set loss is found to be most
affected by N , while K and H compensate for each other (the higher K, the
lower H , and vice versa). Based on the validation set loss values, we choose
the best values of N , H , K and Ltrain, which are common for both sexes, as
reported in Sec. A.4.
To confirm the model performance using the parameters selected above,
we retrain it (separately for men and women) on the combination of training
and validation sets, measuring the final loss and final bias (average difference
between predicted and target log-rates) on the test set. The results for men
and women, respectively, are as follows: final training and validation set loss is
0.00682 and 0.00696, final test set loss is 0.0106 and 0.0122 and final test set
bias is 0.0241 and -0.0255.
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